plaintext-ciphertext pairs. To the best of our knowledge, the result proposed in this paper is the best cryptanalytic result for MIBS, so far.
Introduction
MIBS [ISSK09] is a lightweight block cipher suitable for constraint environments, such as RFID tags and sensor networks. MIBS was proposed by Izadi et al. in 2009 ; it has a simple Feistel structure and an SPN round function. The first and detailed cryptanalysis of reduced-round MIBS was realized by Bay et al. [BNV10] and they gave linear, differential and impossible differential cryptanalyses of MIBS. The best attack among them was the linear attack on the 18-round MIBS-80 with the time complexity of 2 78.62 18-round MIBS encryptions. Linear cryptanalysis was proposed by Matsui and firstly applied to FEAL cipher [MY93] and subsequently to DES [Mat94b] . It is a known-plaintext attack and the adversary assumes that the plaintexts are independent and linearly distributed over the message space {0, 1}
n . Essentially, the attack exploits linear (or affine) relations of plaintext, ciphertext and the key bits. Afterwards, Matsui [Mat94a] discovered that using two linear approximations together helps to reduce the data complexity of linear cryptanalysis. Simultaneously, Kaliski and Robshaw [JR94] introduced multiple linear cryptanalysis to reduce data complexities of Matsui's algorithms by using several approximations, but each linear approximation involves the same key bits. Then, Biryukov et al. [BCQ04] further improved this technique by using several linear approximations involving different key bits. However, both in Kaliski-Robshaw's and Biryukov et al.'s techniques, the statistical independence of each linear approximations is assumed. It is shown by Murphy in [Mur06] that this assumption may not hold in general. Biryukov et al. [BCQ04] is also added an enhancement heuristically to its method by using more approximations which are linearly and statistically dependent. Afterwards, Baignères et al. [BJV04] proposed a statistical linear distinguisher, such that statistical independence of linear approximations is not needed anymore. In their technique, the attack is modeled as a hypothesis testing problem based on the log-likelihood ratio (LLR). They showed that the efficiency of a multidimensional distinguisher is measured by the distance of its distribution to the uniform distribution. This distance is then called the capacity (see Definition 1) which is directly related to the number of samples N needed for the attack.
Hermelin et al. further analyzed this technique for extending Matsui's Algorithm 1 and Matsui's Algorithm 2 to multiple dimensions by using some statistical techniques [HCN08,CHN09,HCN09,HN10,Her10,HN11,HN12]. They studied on the goodness-of-fit problem solved by the χ 2 -statistic, the LLR-statistic method and the convolution method. They showed how to use correlations of one-dimensional linear approximations to determine multidimensional probability distributions (see Lemma 2), and to compute the capacity (see Lemma 3). They verified the new techniques on the AES candidate Serpent. In this paper, we present a multidimensional linear attack on the 19-round MIBS-80 which outperforms the previous linear attack in terms of the number of rounds, time and data complexities. See Table 1 for the comparison of our results with the existing ones. We exploit Bay et al.'s attack by finding/using more linear approximations to reduce the data complexity. Moreover, we use Nguyen et al.'s approach to decrease time complexity of the attack, which enables us to attack on one more round.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give a brief description of MIBS in Section 2. Some mathematical background and the detailed description of the linear attack in multiple dimensions are given in Section 3. Section 4 gives our multidimensional linear attack on the 19-round MIBS-80. Section 5 proposes a chosen-message version of the attack given in Section 4 on the 19-round MIBS-80. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Description of MIBS
MIBS [ISSK09] is a block cipher using the conventional Feistel structure (see Fig.  1 ). MIBS has a 64-bit block size supporting 64-bit and 80-bit keys and iterates 32 rounds for both key sizes. The round function F of MIBS is an SPN composed of an XOR layer with a round key, a layer of 4 × 4-bit S-Boxes (S layer), and a linear transformation layer (P layer), in this order. The components of the encryption process involved in F are explained as follows. Note that all internal operations in MIBS are nibble-wise, that is, on 4-bit words. S-Box layer S : After key addition, the state s i is split into eight nibbles and identical 4 × 4 S-Boxes (see Table 2 ) are applied in parallel. Linear transformation layer P : The input (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 , y 7 , y 8 ) is transformed into its output (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 , y 5 , y 6 , y 7 , y 8 ) by
where y i 's and y i 's are 4-bit words.
Key Schedule: For our attack purposes, we mention only the 80-bit version of the key schedule generating 32-bit round keys K i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ 32. Let state i denote the ith round key state and let state 0 denote the 80-bit secret key. Considering bit numbering in right-to-left, 80-bit key schedule is formalized in Algorithm 1. In these algorithms, "≫" means bitwise rotation to right, " " means string concatenation, and "∼" indicates a sequence of bit positions. In addition, S denotes the S-Box which is the same as the S-Box (see Table 2 ) in the round function. In the rest of this thesis, we denote by MIBS-80 (resp. MIBS-64) the 80-bit key (resp. 64-bit key) version of MIBS. Note that the input to the ith round is denoted by ( 
Preliminary

Mathematical Background
We denote by F 2 the field with two elements and F m 2 denotes the m-dimensional vector space over F 2 . Let X be a discrete random variable in F m 2 and p = (p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p 2 m −1 ) be the probability distribution of X such that
. . , p η ) and q = (q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q η ) be two discrete probability distributions with sample space S. Then, the capacity between p and q is
In the case where q is the uniform distribution θ, the capacity is denoted by (
The bias of Y , denoted as ε is equal to c(Y )/2. Let X be an m-bit random variable with probability distribution p and a ∈ F m 2 . Then, we have
The following lemma proves that the probability distribution p of m-bit random variable X, taking values from F m 2 , is computed by the correlations of a · X, where a ∈ F m 2 .
Lemma 2. ([HCN08])
Let X be an m-bit random taking values from F m 2 variable with probability distribution p, then
Lemma 3. ([HCN08]) Let X be an m-bit random variable taking values from F m 2 and p be its probability distribution. Then, the capacity of p is
Matsui's Algorithm 2 in Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Let f : F n 2 → F n 2 be a vectorial Boolean function and binary vectors w i ∈ F n 2 and u i ∈ F n 2 be the binary masks such that the pairs (u i , w i ) are linearly independent. Each one-dimensional approximation of f is defined as a function g i such that
where all g i 's are the base approximations for i = 1, . . . , m. Let c i be the correlation of g i , i = 1, . . . , m, and g = (g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g m ) be an m-dimensional vectorial Boolean function. Let p = (p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p 2 m −1 ) be the probability distribution of g. This p can be computed from all possible one-dimensional correlations by Lemma 2.
For an n-bit block cipher of r rounds, R r denotes the last round of the cipher with its inverse R −r , and K r ∈ F 2 denotes the last round key. K r is also called the outer key. Let x and y be the plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. The (r − 1)-round m-dimensional linear approximation of the block cipher is written by
T and W = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m ) T are the matrices of the masks for the texts and the inner key bits, respectively. The matrix V splits the inner key bits into 2 m equivalent classes such that
This implies that C(p) = C(p z ), for all z ∈ F m 2 . Now, we denote by K r and z the right rth round key and the right inner key class, respectively. The aim of Matsui's Algorithm 2 for multidimensional linear attacks is to find K r as well as z. Note that we only attack on the last round key, but recovering more round keys is doable. The attack is mainly composed of four phases, namely, the distillation phase, the analysis phase, the ranking phase and the search phase.
In the distillation phase, we collect N plaintext-ciphertext pairs (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . ,(x N , y N ), where x 1 , . . . , x N are taken independently from the uniform distribution. By Algorithm 2, we compute the empirical probability distributions q[K r , ·] for eah key candidate K r which are
In the analysis phase, we choose the convolution method [HN10, Her10] , as it is efficient in terms of both time and data complexities. Let p and q be the probability distributions of two m-bit random variables, X and Y , respectively. The ith component of the convolution of p and q is defined as
Algorithm 2 Distillation phase 1: procedure Compute q ((x1, y 1 ), . . . , (xN , y N ) , g1, g2, . . . , gm) 2:
for t = 1 → N do 3:
for Kr = 0 → 2 − 1 do 4:
partially decrypt y t and obtain yt = R −r (y t , Kr) 5: Using the convolution method, the mark of each key candidate K r is defined by
For each possible K r , we find the maximal component of the convolution (q[K r , ·] * p), and record this maximal component as G(K r ) together with its corresponding index z . Because, the right key K r is supposed to have the highest mark G(K r ) and the right inner key z is recovered corresponding to G( K r ). The detailed process of the analysis phase is mentioned in Algorithm 3.
In the ranking phase, we rank the key candidates by G(K r ), and the keys are sorted in a decreasing order according to their ranking values. Under a predetermined advantage a, the right key candidate K r should be within the position of 2 −a , where is the number of targeted key bits. Then, the search phase, where the remaining key bits are searched and the correctness of the ranking result is verified, can be done by a number of trial encryptions according to the sorted candidate list.
Complexities of Multidimensional Linear Attacks (by the Convolution Method)
The advantage of the convolution method can be computed from the following Theorem.
Theorem 4. [Her10] To distinguish the uniform distribution from the distributions of p z which are close to the uniform one (z ∈ F m 2 ), the advantage of the convolution method for finding the last round key K r is given by
where P S (> 0.5) is the success probability, N is the amount of data required for the attack, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution, C(p) is the capacity of p and m is the dimension of the linear approximation.
From Theorem 4, the data complexity N of the convolution method is approximated to
where C(p) is the capacity of p, a denotes the advantage, and m is the dimension of the linear approximation. The time complexity of the analysis phase is m2 m+ operations. In the ranking phase, sorting can be done within 2 . In addition, the time complexity of the search phase depends on the advantage, i.e. 2 k−a , where k is the master key size. Algorithm 2 computes the empirical probability distributions for all keys K r with O(mN 2 ) time complexity, in a conventional way. However, this complexity can be reduced to O(N + λ2 m+ ) in [NWW11] , where λ > 0 differs by the attack cases. That is, if only the last round(s) keys are attacked, then λ = 4m + 3 , and if both first and last rounds keys are attacked, then λ = 3m + 3 . This is not somewhat different from the extension of the Collard's method for reducing the time complexity of the Matsui's Algorithm 2 [CSQ07] .
However, in [NWW11] , they consider linear approximations having the same output masks and they compute the empirical probability distribution for both cases. In our attack, linear approximations have different input and output masks, we slightly modify their strategy to use and present as follows. Note that in our case the active S-boxes in the first and last rounds are the same for all linear approximations even with different masks. , g 2 , . . . , g m ), where η ∈ F m 2 and K contains bits from both K 1 and K r in total, is computed with O(mN +(2m+3 )2 +m +2 ) time complexity and O(2 m+ ) memory complexity.
Proof. For the details of this proof please refer to Appendix A. The proof can also be implied by the attack procedure explained in Section 4.
Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MIBS-80
In this section, we apply a 12-dimensional linear attack on the 19 rounds of MIBS-80 by using the convolution method [Her10] .
Previous 16-round Linear Approximations
Bay et al. [BNV10] found a set of six 16-round linear approximations with 31 active S-boxes. Namely, these linear approximations are due to the six possible instantiations from the linear approximation table (LAT) (see Appendix B) of MIBS, (w, z) ∈ {(2 x , 6 x ), (6 x , 2 x ), (4 x , e x ), (e x , 4 x ), ( 
Our set of 16-round Linear Approximations
We exploit the 16-round linear approximations mentioned in Section 4.1 with 31 active S-boxes. We find 594 more by using different combinations of nonzero masks in the last round of them. Strictly speaking, we cut the first 15 rounds of these linear approximations. The total bias of each is 2 −29 . Since the last round input mask to the function F is free to choose, there are ten possible nonzero input masks with nonzero biases for each w, that is, there are two nonzero input masks with a bias of 2 −2 and eight input masks with a bias of 2 −3 . The values of w's and their correspondingȳ's andz's (here, w,ȳ and z form the masks together) are given in Table 3 in a group manner. Hence, we take all possible combinations of all values for (ȳ,z) and obtain 600 linear approximations 2 depicted in Table 4 . Note that the last pair of bit masks in Table 4 stands for the output masks after the swapping of half blocks in a round. These approximations are indeed generated by twelve base linear approximations. For example, one set of twelve base approximations is (w,ȳ,z) ∈ B = {(2 x , 6 x , 6 x ), (2 x , 6 x , b x ), (2 x , b x , 6 x ), (4 x , 9 x , e x ), (4 x , 9 x , 9 x ), (4 x , e x , 9 x ), (8 
A 12-dimensional Linear Attack on the 19 rounds of MIBS-80
We use all possible 2 12 − 1 (dependent and independent) linear approximations generated from the base approximations mentioned in Section 4.2. We attack on 19 rounds of MIBS-80 by using the convolution method [Her10] together with the (modified) Nguyen et al.'s approach [NWW11] (see Section 3.3). We recover some key bits from the last round key as well as the first and the second rounds' keys, by considering them as a combined -bit key. Note that the 600 linear approximations that we found in Section 4.2 are useful to compute the (lower bound of) capacity of the system which is used for finding the required number of the data for the attack.
We perform a key-recovery attack on 19 rounds of MIBS-80 by placing the 16-round linear approximations of 12-dimension between rounds 3 and 18. Because the capacity of the 12-dimensional linear approximation is 2 −53.415 , according to Theorem 4, the data requirement is N = 2 57.874 plaintext-ciphertext pairs by taking 10 bits of advantage, i.e. a = 20. According to Theorem 4 our attack's success probability is P S = 0.9. We recover some part of the key bits from the first, second and the last rounds. We guess K 1 (except K 1,3 ), K 2,6 , K 19 (except K 19,3 ), which make 60 round key bits in total. Notice that the third S-Box of the first round is not active due to the fact that its output is not needed to compute the input to the first and the sixth S-Boxes in the second round. All four phases of the attack are explained as follows.
We call T = P ⊕ S, composed of the S and the P layers of MIBS. Let α = 0w0w000w, β = 00ȳ0000z, where w,ȳ andz take their values from the set B. Notice that any set of base approximations is acceptable. According to the set B, the combined coefficients (represented as 12-dimensional vectors) of the 2 12 − 12 − 1 approximations are also known. Table 4 . A set of 16-round linear approximations, where " * " can be 2 −3 , 2 −4 or 2 −5 , and w and z take the values as we mentioned in Section 4.1. 
. Then, the base and combined approximations are
where
Here, (P, C) denotes the text bits interacting with the -bit attacked key bits. According to α a and β a , we know only 64 bits of K ⊕ v involved in the computation of g a . Thus, hereafter when we mention g a (K ⊕ v), we mean that the function g a acts directly on these 64 bits. That is, K ⊕ v actually denotes the 64 active bits. Here, K includes the 64 active key bits in K 1 , K 2 and K 19 and v is the 64 bits of texts.
The base approximations are denoted as h a (P, C) ⊕ g a (K , (P, C) ), where a = 1, . . . , 12. After examining the key schedule of MIBS-80, it can be verified that K 1 and K 2 share four attacked bits in common, that is plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Since we obtain the empirical probability distribution from the observed data, and we can compute the theoretical probability distributions from 600 linear approximations by Lemma 2, we can directly apply the convolution method described in Algorithm 3. Then, we obtain the right key and the right inner key class by sorting their marks. 
The Chosen-Plaintext Version of the Attack
The time and memory complexities of the attack on the reduced-round MIBS-80 detailed in Section 4 can be reduced by fixing some plaintext bits corresponding to the active S-Boxes like in [KM01] . The main reason is that we do not need to guess the key bits corresponding to the fixed data, as any output parity of the S-Box will always be fixed, that is, it is always 0 or 1. Due to the fact that we need 2 57.874 number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs for the attack, we have the freedom of fixing 4-bits of plaintexts corresponding to the one S-box. Let us consider 4 fixed plaintext bits for the first active S-Box of the first round. Hence, the number of guessed key bits becomes = 56 bits instead of = 60 bits. By updating the previous attack according to this method with using the same number of data, we obtain 2 74.228 19-round encryptions of time and 2 72 block units of memory.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a multidimensional linear cryptanalysis on the reducedround MIBS-80. The attack is faster than the previous linear attack, also requires less data complexity thanks to exploiting many linear approximations. As far as we know, the result proposed in this paper is the best cryptanalytic result for MIBS-80, so far. Due to the fact that S a is a circulant matrix (see [CSQ07] ), r[a, ·] is computed in 3 2 operations with 2 bytes to store the first row of S a . The total time complexity of computing r is 3 2 +m multiplications. Finally, by using Lemma 2, we get q[K, ·] = 2 −m Hr[·, K] with m2 m time complexity. The total time complexity of computing q is m2 +m . The memory complexity for q is 2 m+ block units. By summing up all above steps, the time complexity is O(mN + (2m + 3 )2 +m + 2 ). Here, we use O notation because the exact value depends on the detailed time unit. According to the size of the used matrices, the memory complexity is 2 m+ block units.
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